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Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 2227 Shadow Canyon, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 
409 (Nov. 22, 2017)1 
	
PROPERTY LAW: HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATION FORECLOSURE SALES 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court considered an appeal from a district court order granting summary judgment.  In 
its holding, the Court concluded that it would not invalidate a foreclosure sale based on a low sales 
price alone.  The commercial reasonableness standard established by Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) does not apply to Homeowner’s Association (HOA) foreclosures 
because they involve real property sales.  Rather, there must be a showing of “fraud, unfairness, 
or oppression” on behalf of the seller.2  
 
Background 
 
 The property in dispute was in a neighborhood overseen by an HOA.  The previous 
homeowner had obtained a loan to purchase the property and secured that loan via a deed of trust 
that was later assigned to Appellant Nationstar.  When the previous homeowner became 
delinquent, the HOA agent entered a notice of default and a notice of sale, and then sold the 
property at a foreclosure sale to Saticoy Bay for $35,000.  After the sale, Saticoy Bay sought a 
declaration to extinguish Nationstar’s deed of trust so that Saticoy Bay would have an 
unencumbered title to the property.  
 In response, Nationstar argued that sales price for the property was commercially 
unreasonable as the appraisal value was listed at $335,000.  Nationstar’s relied on the Restatement 
(Third) of Property: Mortgages § 8.3 (1997).3  Saticoy Bay rebutted with the contention that 
“commercial reasonableness” was not relevant in relation to HOA foreclosure sales.  The parties 
went to court and ultimately Saticoy Bay won on summary judgment after the court concluded that 
Article 9 of the U.C.C. does not apply to HOA foreclosure sales.   
 
Discussion 
 
 The first matter relevant to this case was whether the U.C.C. Article 9’s portion on 
commercial reasonableness applies to an HOA’s foreclosure sale of real property. The Court 
concluded it had no bearing on the matter because Nevada already has requirements that an HOA 
must follow when foreclosing on real property to secure its lien.  In addition, there is nothing in 
the U.C.C. to indicate the drafters intended the commercial reasonableness standard to apply to 
real property foreclosure sales.  The Court then established that no matter how grossly inadequate 
a price may be, it is not grounds to set aside a sale.4  Finally, because Nationstar did not illustrate 
any form of fraud, unfairness, or oppression the Court upheld the district court’s ruling of summary 
judgment.  
																																																						
1  By Connor Saphire. 
2  Shadow Wood Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. New York Community Bancorp, Inc., 132 Nev., Adv. Op. 5, 366 P.3d 
1105 (2016).  
3  Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages § 8.3 (1997). 
4  Golden v. Tomiyasu, 79 Nev. 503, 514, 387 P.2d 989, 995 (1963).	
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U.C.C. Article 9’s commercial reasonableness standard is inapplicable in the context of an HOA 
foreclosure sale of real property 
  
 Article 9 of the U.C.C. lays out the general framework whereby a person may obtain money 
from a creditor in exchange for granting a security interest in personal property.5  It also states how 
a creditor may repossess and dispose of personal property if a debtor has defaulted.6  The Court 
has previously recognized (at least implicitly) two things: (1) the secured creditor has an 
affirmative obligation to obtain the highest sales price possible; and (2) if the sale is challenged, 
the secured creditor has the burden of establishing commercial reasonableness.7  Nationstar 
contended, therefore, that the HOA had the burden of establishing that it took all the steps to obtain 
the highest sales price possible.   
 The Court disagreed with Nationstar’s argument.  In contrast to Article 9, NRS Chapter 
116 already provides intricate requirements that an HOA must follow to foreclose on the real 
property securing its lien.8  This statutory scheme infringes on an HOA’s ability to increase the 
winning bid at sale and therefore makes Article 9’s commercial reasonableness standard improper 
for HOA foreclosure sales of real property.  
 The Court supported its holding by pointing to the Uniform Common Interest Ownership 
Act (UCIOA), which NRS Chapter 116 is modeled after.9  The UCIOA recognizes that there are 
three different types of common-interest communities and in one of those, the owner’s interest in 
his or her property is characterized as a “personal property” interest.10  These types of common 
interest communities are: (1) a condominium or planned community,” (2) “a cooperative whose 
unit owners’ interest in the units are real estate,” and (3) “a cooperative whose unit owners’ 
interests in the units are personal property.”11  A state adopting UCIOA provisions is prompted by 
the UCIOA to choose and insert the following methods of sale for the three common interest 
community types: 
 
(1) In a condominium or planned community, the association’s lien 
must be foreclosed in like manner as a mortgage on real estate 
[or by power of sale under appropriate state statute]; 
(2) In a cooperative whose unit owners’ interests in the units are real 
estate . . . , the association’s lien must be foreclosed in like 
manner as a mortgage on real estate [or by power of sale under 
the appropriate state statute] [or by power of sale under 
subsection (k)]; or 
																																																						
5  NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 104.9109(1); U.C.C. § 9-109(a) (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n (2009)); see generally 
William H,. Lawrence, William H. Henning & R. Wilson Freyermuth, Understanding Secured Transactions §§ 1.01-
1.03 (4th ed. 2007) (providing an overview of Article 9’s purpose and scope). 
6  See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 104.9601.9628; U.C.C. §§ 9-601 to 9-628. 
7  See Dennison v. Allen Grp. Leasing Corp., 110 Nev. 181, 186, 871 P.2d 288, 291 (1994); Savage Constr., Inc. v. 
Challenge-Cook Bros., Inc., 102 Nev. 34, 37, 714 P.2d 573, 575 (1986); Levers v. Rio King Land & Inv. Co., 93 
Nev. 95, 98, 560 P.2d 917, 920 (1977); accord Chittenden Tr. Co. v. Maryanski, 415 A.2d 206, 209 (Vt. 1980) 
(“[T]he majority rule appears to be that the secured party has the burden of pleading and proving that any given 
disposition of collateral was commercially reasonable . . . ”).  
8  See SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 75, 334 P.3d 408, 416 (2014).   
9  SFR Invs., 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 75, 334 P.3d at 408. 
10  See 1982 UCIOA § 3-116(j) (emphasis added).  
11  Id.   
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(3) In a cooperative whose unit owners interests in the units are 
personal property . . . , the association’s lien must be foreclosed 
in like manner as a security interest under.12 
 
Had the UCIOA drafters intended for Article‘s commercial reasonableness standard to apply to 
real property foreclosures and to personal property foreclosures, it is likely that they would have 
included such language in subsections (j)(1) and (2) of the Act.13  
 
A low sales price, in and of itself, does not warrant invalidating an HOA foreclosure sale 
 
 In previous cases, the Court established the held that “demonstrating that an association 
sold a property at its foreclosure sale for an inadequate price is not enough to set aside that sale; 
there must also be a showing of fraud, unfairness, or oppression.”14  
 Nationstar contended that the Court had previously adopted the Restatement’s suggestion 
that a sale for less than 20 percent of the property’s fair market value may “[g]enerally” be 
invalidated by a court.15  However, simply because this assertion was previously cited in a case 
does not mean the Court implicitly adopted it. In fact, this adoption would be inconsistent with the 
Court’s previous holding in Golden v. Tamiyasu, where it held that the “inadequacy of price, 
however gross, is not in itself a sufficient ground for setting aside a trustee’s sale” without “proof 
of some element of fraud, unfairness, or oppression.”16  
 Price is not completely irrelevant.  It is not sufficient by itself to invalidate a foreclosure 
sale, but when accompanied by irregularities in the sales process that demonstrate fraud, 
unfairness, or oppression, it should be considered.17  
 
Nationstar’s identified irregularities do not show that the HOA foreclosure sale was affected by 
fraud, unfairness, or oppression 
 
 Nationstar pointed to three irregularities in the process of the foreclosure sale that indicated 
fraud, unfairness, or oppression: (1) the HOA’s lien included fines in addition to monthly 
assessments even though NRS 116.31162(5) prohibits an HOA from foreclosing on a lien 
comprised of fines; (2) the notice of sale listed the unpaid lien amount as of the day the notice of 
sale was generated even though NRS 116.311635(3)(a) requires the notice of sale to list what the 
unpaid lien amount will be on the date of the to-be-held sale; and (3) the person who signed the 
notice of default was not the person who the HOA’s president designated to sign the notice, which 
violated NRS 116.31162(2).  The Court addressed these arguments individually.  
 
 
 
																																																						
12  1982 UCIOA § 3-116(j)(1)-(3).  
13  See Norman Singer & Shambie Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47:23 (7th ed. 2016) (“[W]here a 
legislature includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same act, it is 
generally presumed the legislature acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion . . . .”) 
quotation and alterations omitted)). 
14  Shadow Wood Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 366 P.3d at 1105. 
15  Id. at 1112.  
16  Golden v. Tomiyasu, 79 Nev. 503, 514, 387 P.2d 989, 995 (1963). 
17  Id.		
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 Foreclosure of a lien that includes fines does not invalidate the sale 
 
Nationstar’s interpretation of NRS 116.31162(5) is incorrect.  This statute authorizes an 
HOA’s lien, and provides that an HOA has a lien for fines and monthly assessments and that those 
fines and monthly assessments automatically become part of the HOA’s lien as soon as they 
become due.  Under Nationstar’s construction, an HOA could not foreclose on a homeowner if it 
had imposed a fine. However, there is no indication that the Legislature intended the result that 
Nationstar proposed.  It is apparent that the Legislature’s intended to prohibit an HOA from 
foreclosing on a lien that was comprised soley of fines because the Legislature did not consider 
NRS 116.3116(1) when it enacted NRS 116.31162(5),.18 
 Nationstar also suggested that there was unfairness in the sale because all the foreclosure 
proceeds were distributed to the HOA instead of the HOA’s superpriority lien amount.  However, 
Satico Bay correctly pointed out that NRS 116.31166(2) absolved it of any responsibility to ensure 
that the sale proceeds are properly distributed.  
 
The notice of sale’s failure to list the unpaid lien amount on the date of the sale does not 
amount to fraud, unfairness, or oppression 
 
 Nationstar’s second argument centered around NRS 116.311635(3)(a), which states that 
the notice of sale “must include [t]he amount necessary to satisfy the lien as of the date of the 
proposed sale.”  In this case, the notice of sale listed the unpaid lien amount as of the date the 
notice was generated not as of the date of the future sale. Even though the HOA’s notice of sale 
did amount to a violation of the statute, it did not amount to fraud, unfairness, or oppression.  
 
 The person who signed the notice of default was authorized by the HOA to do so 
 
Nationstar’s last argument was based upon NRS 116.31162(2), which states that the notice 
of default “must be signed by the person designated in the declaration or by the association for that 
purpose or, if no one is designated, by the president of the association.”  Specifically, Nationstar 
argued that the HOA violated this statute because its notice of default was signed by an employee 
of the HOA’s agent and there is no evidence showing that the HOA’s declaration or the HOA’s 
president specifically designated this employee as the person who could sign this notice of default.   
The reason this argument is faulted is because a person may be designated to sign the notice 
in three ways, one of which is by the association.  So, “the association” can designate a person to 
sign even if the declaration or president do not sign the notice.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.  It held that even though 
the $35,000 sales price of the foreclosed property was below its appraised value, such a low sales 
price does not invalidate a foreclosure sale as a matter of law.  Instead, there must be a 
demonstration of fraud, unfairness, or oppression, which in this case, Nationstar failed to show.  
																																																						
18  See Barney v. Mount Rose Heating & Air Conditioning, 192 P.3d 730, 734 (2008) (“Statutes are to be read in the 
context of the act and the subject matter as a whole . . . .”); Banegas v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 19 P.3d 245, 249 
(2001) (“The intent of the Legislature may be discerned by reviewing the statute or the chapter as a whole.”). 
